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SFAS 133 requires most types of hedge ineffectiveness to be measured on a fair value 
basis and reported in earnings. This earnings recognition requirement was the focal point 
of controversy surrounding the adoption of SFAS 133. The debate also reflects the more 
general controversy over whether to recognize fair-value-based gains or losses into 
earnings. Using a sample of bank holding companies, I find evidence that the recognition 
of the fair-value-based hedging performance measure under SFAS 133 improves the 
value and risk relevance of accounting earnings. The findings of this study are relevant to 
the evaluation of SFAS 133 as well as the ongoing debate on the income statement 
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CHAPTER 1:  INTRODUCTION 
Prior to the adoption of Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 133 (Accounting 
for Derivative Instruments and Hedging Activities; hereafter, SFAS 133), most hedging 
derivatives were carried off balance sheet. Accordingly, changes in the market value of these 
derivatives were generally not reflected in the financial statements until the derivative contracts 
impacted cash flows at the time of their settlement. SFAS 133 has changed this accounting 
practice by requiring all derivative instruments to be recognized on the balance sheet. Per SFAS 
133, hedging derivatives will impact earnings to the extent that the gains/losses on the hedging 
instrument and the corresponding hedged item are not able to cancel out each other. This study 
investigates whether the inclusion of the fair-value-based hedging performance measure under 
SFAS 133 improves the value and risk relevance of accounting earnings.  
Studying SFAS 133’s income statement effects is important given that the earnings 
recognition requirement was the focal point of controversy surrounding the adoption of SFAS 
133. 1  In particular, one of the most cited reasons for corporate resistance to the proposed 
standard is the concern that the recognition of fair-value-based hedging gains/losses would 
introduce artificial noise to earnings because fair value gains/losses are transitory in nature. The 
significance attached to accounting earnings by various financial reporting constituents explains 
why there has been so much attention devoted to SFAS 133’s earnings impact. While previous 
research (Ahmed et al. 2006, 2010) provides evidence on the effects of SFAS 133 on the value 
and risk relevance of balance-sheet-based accounting measures, the findings cannot speak to the 
income statement consequences of recognizing the fair-value-based hedging performance 
                                               
1
 Singh (2004) reports that almost two thirds of the comment letters in response to the exposure draft list the 
standard’s earnings impact as a major point of discussion.  
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measure as required by SFAS 133.2 This study is the first that directly examines the highly 
debated question of whether SFAS 133 improves or obscures earnings’ ability to summarize 
information on firm performance.  
This study can also help shed light on a larger controversy that has frequently arisen in the 
ongoing debate over fair value accounting. The controversy concerns whether fair value 
accounting treatment on the balance sheet should always extend to the income statement. The 
recent SEC report on mark-to-market accounting highlights that current GAAP allows a 
substantial subset of assets measured at fair value on the balance sheet not to be marked-to-
market through the income statement (changes in fair values flowing to OCI instead of to 
earnings) in face of the opponents’ argument that fair-value-based gains/losses are transitory in 
nature and thus should be excluded from core earnings.  
In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, the income statement treatment of changes in 
financial instruments’ fair values has received even greater attention. For example, in response to 
pressure from finance industries and regulatory bodies, the FASB issued FASB Staff Position 
Papers regarding issues related to the other-than-temporary impairment model for debt and 
equity securities in spring 2009. One of the most significant changes provided by the position 
papers is to require the recognition of only credit losses through earnings while allowing the 
remaining portion of fair value losses to be recorded in other comprehensive income (OCI). This 
move was strongly backed by major interest groups representing financial industries, including 
the American Bankers Association and the International Swaps and Derivatives Association. The 
heightened attention this issue has received from accounting practitioners and regulators 
warrants more research than what is currently available. This study contributes to this under-
                                               
2
 As an example, Barth et al. (2003) show that the recognition of a price-relevant accounting amount can decrease 
the value relevance of earnings if the signal-to-noise ratio of the new component is sufficiently lower than the 
signal-to-noise ratio of the previously recognized amount.  
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researched area by providing evidence on the income statement effects of one of the most 
prominent fair value accounting standards to date.  
Using a sample of bank holding companies, I find evidence inconsistent with the widely held 
notion that the fair-value-based hedging performance measure represents a form of ‘transitory’ 
income. First, the fair-value-based hedging performance measure recognized into earnings under 
SFAS 133 is shown to be persistent with a positive autocorrelation while the fair values of 
hedging derivatives are mean reverting with changes in these fair values exhibiting a negative 
autocorrelation. Second, the earnings measure in the post-SFAS 133 period that includes the fair-
value-based hedging performance measure outperforms a constructed income measure that 
excludes this component in terms of ability to explain concurrent stock returns. Third, I find that 
the fair-value-based hedging performance measure has incremental explanatory power over stock 
returns with hedging losses being given a higher weight than hedging gains. Fourth, I document 
a positive association between the volatility of the fair-value-based hedging performance 
measure and idiosyncratic stock return volatility. Taken together, the results from this study 
suggest that the recognition of the fair-value-based hedging performance measure under SFAS 
133 improves the value and risk relevance of accounting earnings. These findings are relevant to 
the evaluation of SFAS 133 as well as the ongoing debate on the income statement treatment of 
net asset changes due to the application of fair value accounting. 
This study differs from previous research on fair value income measures (Barth et al. 1994; 
Hann et al. 2007; Hodder et al. 2006) by focusing on the fair valued earnings component 
produced by an actual accounting standard instead of on a researcher-constructed, disclosure-
based income measure. In particular, the fair-value-based earnings component attributed to 
SFAS 133 is intended to capture, albeit imperfectly, a meaningful aspect of underlying firm 
 4
performance (i.e. hedging performance) that is likely to be persistent. The findings from this 
study suggest that SFAS 133 has been at least partially successful in achieving this intention. At 
the same time, fair values of hedging derivatives are shown to be mean reverting with the 
changes in these fair values exhibiting a negative autocorrelation. This means that a study based 
on a fair value income measure constructed from available disclosures of derivative fair values 
would yield findings that point to the opposite direction. Therefore, SFAS 133 exemplifies a 
setting where the transitory nature of changes in fair values does not apply to the actual 
component introduced into earnings by the fair value accounting standard. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews institutional 
background and previous literature on derivative accounting. Section 3 develops testable 
hypotheses. Section 4 describes the data. Section 5 presents the results of the empirical tests. 
Section 6 concludes.  
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CHAPTER 2:  INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND AND PREVIOUS RESEARCH 
 Accounting for Derivatives before SFAS 133 
The primary authoritative literature of derivative accounting prior to SFAS 133 consisted of 
SFAS 52, Foreign Currency Translation, and SFAS 80, Accounting for Futures Contracts. By 
definition, these standards only cover a limited set of hedging instruments; consequently, a large 
number of derivative instruments (most notably, swaps and options) are not covered by any 
formal accounting standard. In practice, accounting treatment of these derivative instruments was 
determined by analogies to SFAS 52 and SFAS 80 and related consensus positions of the 
FASB’s Emerging Issues Task Force (EITF). For example, EITF Issue No. 84-36 introduced the 
notion of ‘synthetic alteration,’ which developed into the standard way of accounting for interest 
swap contracts (Gastineau et al. 2001). Briefly, synthetic accounting bundles an interest swap 
hedging a floating-rate (fixed-rate) note with the hedged item and treats the combination as a 
fixed-rate (floating-rate) note. As a result, the swap contract itself is not recognized as an 
asset/liability on the balance sheet. Generally, gains/losses on a derivative instrument was mostly 
excluded from the income statement until net settlements hit cash flows in the pre-SFAS 133 
regime, unless the instrument was held for trading or speculative purpose (i.e., no hedging 
relationship is designated/established for the instrument). 
Disclosure requirements prior to SFAS 133 were governed by SFAS 119, Disclosure of 
Information about Derivative Financial Instruments and Fair Value of Financial Instruments, 
which amended two previous statements covering derivatives (SFAS 105, Disclosure of 
Information about Financial Instruments with Off-Balance-Sheet Risk and Financial Instruments 
with Concentrations of Credit Risk, and SFAS 107, Disclosures about Fair Value of Financial 
Instruments). SFAS 119 expanded the disclosure requirement under SFAS 105 and SFAS 107 by 
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requiring firms to provide disaggregated information on notional amounts and fair values of 
derivatives instruments for each derivative category (interest rate, foreign currency, equity, 
commodity, and other), for derivatives held for trading purpose and non-trading purpose 
separately, and to clearly indicate whether the reported fair value of each derivative portfolio 
represents a net asset or a net liability position. 
Accounting for Derivatives under SFAS 133 
SFAS 133 requires all derivatives, regardless of the underlying purpose of the derivative 
holdings, to be carried at fair value on the balance sheet as either an asset or a liability. However, 
derivatives held for trading purpose were already recognized at fair value on the balance sheet 
with any gains or losses (both realized and unrealized) included in earnings before the adoption 
of SFAS 133. As such, SFAS 133 mainly changes the accounting treatment of non-
trading/hedging derivatives.3 
The income statement effect of a derivative instrument depends on the underlying risk being 
hedged. SFAS 133 identifies three types of hedge based on the source of the underlying risk: fair 
value hedge, cash flow hedge, and foreign currency exposure hedge. A fair value hedge is a 
hedge of the exposure to changes in the fair value of recognized assets/liabilities or off-balance-
sheet firm commitments. A cash flow hedge is a hedge of the exposure to potential variability in 
future cash flows associated with recognized assets/liabilities or forecasted transactions. A 
foreign currency cash flow hedge is for a foreign-currency-denominated forecasted transaction or 
a hedge of the foreign currency exposure of a net investment in a foreign operation.  
If a derivative instrument does not qualify for any one of the aforementioned types of hedge, 
its fair value must be recognized on the balance sheet, and any change in the holding position 
                                               
3
 Following previous literature in the area (Ahmed et al. 2006; Venkatachalam 1999), I use the terms 'non-trading 
derivatives' and ‘hedging derivatives’ interchangeably throughout this paper even though I recognize that they are 
not strictly overlapping.  
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will immediately flow to the income statement without any ‘offsetting’ effects allowed. By 
contrast, a derivative instrument that qualifies as a hedge can have preferential accounting 
treatment because the change in the fair value of the instrument is either recognized together 
with the offsetting gains/losses on the hedged item (fair value hedge) or allowed to be deferred to 
OCI (cash flow hedge). To qualify for the preferential accounting treatment, firms are required to 
designate the hedging instrument, the hedged item, and the specific risks being hedged at the 
inception of the hedge and to provide evidence confirming the effectiveness of the hedge on a 
continuous basis.   
If the hedge is designated as a fair value hedge, the gains/losses on the derivative instrument, 
together with the offsetting gains/losses on the hedged items, must be immediately recognized in 
current earnings. In practice, this means that not only the change in the fair value of the 
derivative contract but also the change in the fair value of the hedged item will directly flow to 
earnings. As a result, a fair value hedge extends the fair value accounting treatment to the hedged 
item that is otherwise accounted for at historical value or carried off-balance sheet.4 For example, 
a fair value hedge of an off-balance-sheet firm commitment will result in the firm commitment 
being recognized at fair value on the balance sheet. By contrast, a cash flow hedge only requires 
the ineffective portion of the hedging gains/losses to be recognized in earnings and allows the 
effective portion to be deferred to OCI. The hedging gains/losses parked in OCI are 
proportionally ‘recycled’ back into earnings as an offset to the earnings effect of the hedged item 
when the hedged item impacts earnings.  
 
 
                                               
4
 SFAS 133 does not allow assets/liabilities that are already measured at fair value (e.g. trading securities) under 
otherwise applicable GAAP to be designated as the hedged item for a fair value hedge.  
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Previous Research on Derivative Accounting 
The evolution of accounting standards covering derivatives has largely followed a path of 
transition towards expanded disclosure and more fair-value-based accounting treatment of 
derivative instruments. The rationale for such a transition is that more current and better 
presented information about derivative instruments will make financial statements more 
transparent and thus more useful to investors. In this section, I briefly review previous research 
that examines whether past accounting standards covering derivatives achieved this purpose.  
Most studies in this category evaluate the accounting standard of interest by examining the 
valuation implications of the newly available information about derivative instruments. 
Specifically, these studies usually use a cross-sectional regression approach and examine 
whether the derivative information mandated by the standard of interest provides incremental 
explanatory power over equity prices or returns beyond traditional financial statements items. 
The derivative information is considered value-relevant and thus useful when the associated 
regression coefficient is statistically different from zero.  
Using such an approach, Barth et al. (1996), Eccher et al. (1996), and Nelson (1996) examine 
the value relevance of fair value information of a variety of banks’ financial assets/liabilities 
(including derivatives) that is mandated to be disclosed under SFAS 107. All three studies found 
evidence that fair values of investment securities have explanatory power beyond book value. 
Barth et al. (1996) find fair values of loans to be consistently value-relevant, while Eccher et al. 
(1996) and Nelson (1996) find no reliable evidence of loans’ value relevance. None of the 
studies finds the fair values of deposits and off-balance sheet instruments (including derivatives) 
to have incremental power in explaining equity values. 
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Attributing the insignificant results for off-balance sheet financial instruments in the above 
studies to the ambiguities in the derivative fair value disclosures under SFAS 107, 
Venkatachalam (1996) examines the value relevance of derivative fair value disclosures under 
SFAS 119 based on a sample of 99 bank holding companies. The findings suggest that the 
disclosed derivative fair values are positively associated with equity values and have incremental 
explanatory power beyond notional amounts of derivatives. By contrast, Ahmed et al. (2006) 
document that derivative fair values disclosed but not recognized under SFAS 119 are not value-
relevant. Using the adoption of SFAS 133 as a setting to examine the differential valuation 
implications of recognized and disclosed assets/liabilities, Ahmed et al. (2006) find that fair 
values of recognized derivatives have incremental explanatory power over equity prices but that 
fair values of disclosed derivatives do not. 
It is noteworthy that the studies discussed above focus on the value relevance of derivative 
fair value as standalone information, which is a different issue than whether incorporating 
derivative gains/losses into earnings will improve the ability of earnings to reflect underlying 
economic performance. As a summary measure of firm performance, accounting earnings is 
intended to capture information predictive of future performance rather than information that 
reflects the firm’s current financial position but has no implications for future performance. 
Therefore, fair value change that represents a completely transitory income shock is expected to 
be value-relevant as standalone information because it reflects the firm’s current financial 
position and should be reflected in the end-of-period equity price. However, incorporating this 
fair value change into core earnings will obscure the ability of earnings to reflect firm 
performance because it has no implications for future performance and thus should be reported 
separately from core earnings.   
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Barth et al. (2003) demonstrate this tension by illustrating how recognition affects the quality 
of the recognized accounting amount in a separate recognition regime versus an aggregate 
recognition regime, where quality is defined as the accounting amount’s explanatory power of 
concurrent stock returns (R2 from the regression of equity value on the accounting amount). In a 
separate recognition regime (i.e., the recognized amount in question refers to a financial 
statement line item), recognition of a previously only disclosed value-relevant accounting 
amount always increases the quality of that accounting amount given the assumption that the 
information processing cost is lower for recognized information than for disclosed information. 
In an aggregate recognition regime (i.e., the recognized amount in question refers to a summary 
accounting measure such as earnings), however, recognition of a previously only disclosed 
value-relevant accounting amount can decrease the quality of the summary measure if the signal-
to-noise ratio of the new component is sufficiently lower than the signal-to-noise ratio of the 
previously recognized amount. Given this tension, it is not surprising that the income statement 
effect of SFAS 133 was the focal point of controversy surrounding the adoption of SFAS 133.  
Prior studies investigating the income statement effect of SFAS 133 (Park 2004; Singh 2004) 
focus on observed earnings volatility and find no significant change in the standard derivation or 
coefficient of variation of quarterly earnings following the adoption of SFAS 133. However, 
comparing overall earnings volatility across the pre- and post-SFAS period is not a promising 
avenue to investigate SFAS 133’s income statement effect because there is no reason to expect 
ex ante a significant change in average earnings volatility unless firms on average are highly 
ineffective in using derivatives to hedge risks.  
As SFAS 133 only requires hedge ineffectiveness to be recognized in current earning, 
observed earnings volatility will increase only if hedging derivative users on average experience 
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earnings shocks from hedge ineffectiveness that are sufficiently significant to have a sizable 
impact on overall earnings volatility. This is unlikely given the evidence that firms on average 
effectively use derivatives to reduce risks (e.g., Guay 1999). Therefore, the income effect of 
SFAS 133 is unlikely to be borne out through a shift in average earnings volatility for derivative 
users.  
In summary, while previous research provides a fair amount of evidence on the value-
relevance of either disclosed or recognized derivative fair values as standalone information, no 
study has provided a direct answer to the highly debated question of whether the required 
recognition of hedge ineffectiveness under SFAS 133 improves or obscures earnings as a 
performance summary measure. The present study fills this gap in the literature.  
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CHAPTER 3: HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Forecasting Power of Hedging Performance 
SFAS 133 requires hedge ineffectiveness (measured as the gains/losses on hedging 
derivatives, net of the hedge item’s impact on earnings) to be recorded in net income in each 
period in which it occurs. By contrast, prior to the adoption of SFAS 133, hedging performance 
was mostly excluded from the income statement until net settlements hit cash flows. A lot of the 
opposition to the earnings’ recognition requirement of SFAS 133 is based on the notion that the 
fair-value-based hedging performance measure represents ‘transitory’ earnings, one-time income 
shocks that have no implication to future outcomes. However, there has been no empirical 
evidence showing that the earnings component attributed to SFAS 133 indeed has the properties 
associated with transitory income.  
As formalized in Ohlson (1999), transitory earnings have three defining properties: 
unpredictability, forecasting irrelevance, and value irrelevance. First, unpredictability establishes 
that current transitory earnings have no predicative power over future transitory earnings (no 
serial correlation). Second, forecasting irrelevance indicates that transitory earnings are irrelevant 
in the forecasting of future total earnings. Finally, value irrelevance implies that transitory 
earnings play no informational role in equity valuation. Ohlson (1999) further demonstrates that 
any two of the three attributes imply the third while any one of the three attributes alone has no 
implications concerning the remaining two. Based on these properties, Ohlson (1999) makes the 
case that transitory earnings need to be eliminated, or at least separated, from core earnings. 
In the debate leading up to the adoption of SFAS 133, opponents argue that the fair-value-
based hedging gains/losses represent a form of transitory income as price move should not be 
persistent in an efficient market. Moreover, critics argue that the hedging performance measure 
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recognized under SFAS 133 can be misleading as the technical requirement to qualify for hedge 
accounting treatment is too stringent for some economically qualified hedges. As a result, SFAS 
133 can force mark-to-market accounting treatment of only one-side of the hedging relation, for 
example, in the case of a sudden termination of hedge accounting treatment for a hedging pair 
that barely missed the hedge effectiveness threshold in one period. Critics of SFAS 133 argue 
that recognizing the gains/losses on the mismatch position can produce a hedging performance 
measure that by design tends to fluctuate and reverse.  
At the same time, there are reasonable grounds to argue against this notion. While the market 
value of any given derivative instrument can be considered to follow a random walk or mean-
reverting process, the hedging portfolio is not randomly assigned to each firm but is determined 
by the firm’s risk management strategy and practice. To the extent that hedge ineffectiveness 
captures ineffective hedging policies or lack of risk management expertise, earnings under SFAS 
133 will capture information that has implications for future performance but was ignored in the 
pre-SFAS 133 regime. While the ‘one-sided’ mark-to-market in the application of hedge 
accounting can be problematic, it is an empirical question whether the problem is so severe that 
the hedging performance measure recognized under SFAS 133 exhibits zero or negative 
autocorrelation.  
 In order to evaluate the opposing views on the forecasting power of hedging performance, I 
empirically test the following hypotheses (in null form): 
H1a (unpredictability): The fair-value-based hedging performance measure has no serial 
correlation.  
H1b (forecasting irrelevance): The fair-value-based hedging performance measure has no 
predictive power over next period’s total earnings.  
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Pre-and-post Comparison of Earnings Response Coefficients 
To follow up on the discussion over transitory earnings in the last section, the attributes of 
the fair-value-based hedging performance measure have testable consequences that can be 
detected through the change in earnings response coefficients following the adoption of SFAS 
133. Specifically, SFAS 133’s earnings recognition requirement would lead to lower (higher) 
earnings response coefficients if the fair-value-based hedging performance measure represents a 
form of transitory (non-transitory) income.5 
According to the model discussed above,  ceteris paribus, the adoption of SFAS 133 would 
lead to lower (higher) earnings response coefficients if the fair-value-based hedging performance 
measure contains primarily transitory (permanent) earnings. In order to isolate the effect of 
SFAS 133 from other unrelated factors, the empirical prediction focuses on the cross-sectional 
differences in the change in earnings response coefficients following the adoption of SFAS 133 
across different level of hedging derivative exposure. Such prediction is based on the assumption 
that any impact of SFAS 133 on earnings should be more prominent for firms with higher level 
of hedging derivative exposure. This generates the following hypothesis (in null form):  
H2: The change in earnings response coefficients following the adoption of SFAS 133 does 
not differ across levels of hedging derivative exposure.  
Relative Explanatory Power of Alternative Income Measures 
One primary purpose of this study is to investigate how the ability of earnings to summarize 
firm performance is affected by the earnings recognition requirement under SFAS 133. 
According to the extant literature, the most direct way to examine this issue is to compare two 
alternative ‘versions’ of earnings, one including the fair-value-based hedging performance 
                                               
5
 The rationale behind this prediction is also consistent with the consequences of transitory earnings as discussed in 
Kothari (2001, 133-134).  
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measure and the other excluding it, in terms the ability to explain concurrent stock returns. 
Initiated in Dechow (1994), this approach represents a significant departure from the emphasis 
on unexpected components of performance measures in capital market research (Kothari 2001). 
Instead, the comparison focuses on performance measures in their realized form based on the 
argument that only realized summary performance measures are used for contracting purpose.  
Under this approach, concurrent stock returns serve as a proxy or benchmark for ‘true’ firm 
performance and the objective is to evaluate the relative superiority of alternative performance 
measures rather than to identify incremental price relevant information. 
As the focal point of controversy surrounding the adoption of SFAS 133 centers on the 
earnings recognition requirement rather than on disclosing hedging performance information to 
investors, evaluating earnings measures in their realized form is well suited for the purpose of 
this study. Along this line, the impact of the SFAS 133’s earnings recognition requirement can 
be borne out through the relative explanatory power of two alternative earnings measures (one 
including the fair-value-based hedging performance measure and the other excluding it) over 
concurrent stock returns. This generates the following hypothesis (in null form):   
H3: The two earnings measures (one including the fair-value-based hedging performance 
measure and the other excluding it) do not differ in terms of the ability to explain concurrent 
stock returns, regardless of the level of hedging derivative exposure.  
Valuation Coefficients of Hedging Gains and Hedging Losses 
As discussed earlier, the earnings component unique to SFAS 133 represents a fair valued 
hedging performance measure. Previous research (Bleck and Liu 2007) argues that the main 
advantage of fair value accounting in general lies in its ability to provide timely signals of 
impending financial distress and thus serve as an early warning mechanism. According to this 
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view, historical cost accounting grants managers a free call option that allows them to hide losses 
to maximize compensation while fair value accounting removes such convex payoff feature. 
This emphasis on ensuring the downside of performance to be apparent in financial 
statements seems particular relevant to the context of SFAS 133. In fact, the adoption of SFAS 
133 is closely related to the 1994 derivative debacles, during which a number of entities suffered 
dramatic and highly publicized losses on derivative holdings designated as hedging derivatives. 
In the aftermath of these debacles, the outcry for more transparent reporting of derivative 
holdings provided the direct motivation for the FASB to expedite its efforts to reform derivative 
accounting that ultimately led up to the issuance of SFAS 133 in 1998. Given this background, it 
is not surprising that proponents of the standard tend to focus on the importance of ensuring that 
earnings timely reflects hedging losses when discussing the standard’s earnings recognition 
requirement (e.g. Gastineau et al. 2001). However, there is no empirical evidence in place 
indicating that hedging losses play a more prominent informational role than hedging gains. I 
examine this issue by testing the following hypothesis (in null form): 
H4: There is no difference between valuation coefficients of hedging gains and hedging 
losses, regardless of the level of hedging derivative exposure.  
Hedge Ineffectiveness and Idiosyncratic Volatility 
Due to accounting earnings’ role as the most sought-after summary performance measure, 
the volatility of earnings is widely perceived as an important gauge for firm risk. In the context 
of fair value accounting, proponents of fair-value-based income measures often argue that 
earnings variability under fair value accounting provides better risk assessment (Ryan 1997). 
However, empirical studies (Barth et al. 1995; Hodder et al. 2006) have found mixed results 
regarding the risk relevance of the volatility of fair-value-based income components. 
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Both Barth et al. (1995) and Hodder et al. (2006) use an aggregated approach and examine 
the risk relevance of the incremental volatility of a constructed fair value income measure that is 
derived by adding to GAAP earnings all fair value gains/losses available from required 
disclosures. The fair-value-based earnings components are considered to be risk relevant when 
higher incremental volatility of the hypothetical income measure is shown to attenuate valuation 
coefficients of earnings in a cross-sectional price-earnings regression. The underlying 
assumption is that all value-relevant risk factors are linearly aggregated into the cost of equity, 
which is essentially the reciprocal of the earnings multiple in the earnings-based valuation model. 
Therefore, the valuation coefficient of earnings is assumed to be negatively associated with 
value-relevant risk factors.  
Clearly, existing literature on the risk relevance of fair value income measures almost 
exclusively focuses on systematic (diversifiable risk). While such an approach is consistent with 
the tenets of classic asset pricing theories6, there seems to be a disconnection between accounting 
research and practice about what would constitute ‘relevant’ risk factors. As Ryan (1997) notes, 
focusing on diversifiable risk may limit the implications of risk relevance research to important 
financial statement stakeholders (e.g. SEC) who are most concerned about how particular classes 
of assets/ liabilities contribute to the firm’s downside performance potential.  
A focus on firm-specific risk is well suited for the context of SFAS 133. Most notably, 
hedging is a firm-specific activity. Due to the highly leveraged nature and the non-linearly 
payoff feature associated with derivative instruments, the fluctuation in hedging performance 
needs to be closely monitored. The application of hedge accounting under SFAS 133 requires 
hedge ineffectiveness to be immediately recognized in earnings. From a risk management 
                                               
6
 It is worth noting that recent studies (Ang et al. 2006; Jiang et al. 2009) have documented a negative association 
between idiosyncratic risk and stock returns. Moreover, the findings from these studies suggest that this relation 
cannot be explained by classic asset pricing risk factors or known market anomalies. 
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perspective, the ideal case is for the firm to be able to consistently minimize hedge 
ineffectiveness over time. This would translate into close-to-zero volatility in the hedge 
ineffectiveness measure. By contrast, high volatility in the hedge ineffectiveness measure may 
signal potentially serious problems with risk management practice and potential large losses in 
the future, an uncertainty factor that can contribute to firm-specific risk that is associated with 
greater downside performance potential. To examine the risk relevance of the hedge 
ineffectiveness measure under SFAS 133, I test the following hypothesis (in null form): 
H5: There is no correlation between the volatility of the hedge ineffectiveness measure and 
the firm’s idiosyncratic risk, regardless of the level of hedging derivative exposure.  
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CHAPTER 4: DATA 
 Sample Selection 
The sample used in this study covers bank holding companies during the period from 1995 
through 2005. I use data from bank holding companies for two reasons. First, financial industries 
are the most important users of derivatives; thus, derivative accounting should be of economic 
significance to bank holding companies. Second, bank holding companies are required by law to 
provide detailed information on derivative holdings in a uniform format through regulatory filing 
(FR-Y9C reports filed with the Federal Reserve Bank). This helps avoid sample selection bias 
and data discrepancy due to differential disclosure policies across firms. I restrict the sample 
period to after 1995 to ensure that derivative position data are available for the entire sample 
period.7 The sample period stops at the end of 2005 because, beginning in 2006, the Federal 
Reserve Bank increased the asset-size threshold for filing the FR Y-9C report from $150 million 
to $500 million, which would result in an inconsistent sample base across the years if years after 
2005 were included. Thus, my sample period spans 11 years: six years in the pre-SFAS 133 
period (1995 to 2000) and five years in the post-SFAS 133 period (2001 to 2005). 
Bank holding companies in my sample must meet the following criteria: (1) quarterly 
financial statement data are available through COMPUSTAT, (2) stock return data are available 
through CRSP, and (3) the bank holding company filed FR-Y9C reports with the Federal 
Reserve Bank during the sample period. This selection procedure yields a final sample of 434 
unique bank holding companies. An important set of my analyses is based on the subsample of 
hedging derivatives users in the post-SFAS 133 period, which comprises 168 unique bank 
holding companies.  
                                               
7
 In the pre-SFAS 133 period, FR-Y9C reports filed after 1995 contain the notional amount and fair value of 
derivatives held for trading and non-trading purposes in compliance with SFAS 107 and 119.  
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 Descriptive Statistics  
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the sample used in this study. Panels A, B and C 
report descriptive statistics for the entire sample period (1995-2005), the pre SFAS 133 period 
(1995-2000), and the post SFAS 133 period (2001-2005) respectively. As reported in Table 1, 
the sample has a mean assets book value of $12.64 billion and a median assets book value of 
$1.05 billion. More than 95% of observations in my sample have a Tier 1 capital ratio above 6% 
and a total risk-based capital ratio above 10%, which are the threshold value to be considered 
well-capitalized under federal bank regulatory agency definitions.  
Table 1 also reports descriptive statistics for derivatives used for risk management. Overall, 
37.63% of the observations in the sample carry non-zero amount of hedging derivatives with a 
mean dollar value of $3.67 billion in notional amount (Panel A). A Comparison across pre- and 
post-SFAS 133 periods shows a moderate increase in the use of hedging derivatives following 
the adoption of SFAS 133, both in terms of the number of users (the percentage of observations 
with non-zero hedging derivatives increases from 36.95% to 38.92%) and the level of exposure 
(the mean dollar value of hedging derivative notional amount increases from $3.47 billion to 
$3.86 billion). These figures suggest that the adoption of SFAS 133 is unlikely to have severely 
suppressed the use of hedging derivatives as some critics of the standard predicted.   
Fair-value-based Hedging Performance Measure 
The purpose of this paper is to evaluate how the fair value accounting treatment of hedging 
derivatives as stipulated by SFAS 133 impacts the value and risk relevance of accounting 
earnings. As such, the fair-value-based hedging performance measure (the earnings component 
attributed to risk management/non-trading derivatives under SFAS 133) serves as a key metric in 
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interpreting the income statement effects of SFAS 133. In this section, I discuss the conceptual 
construct underlying this accounting measure and its empirical construction in more detail.   
It is clear that SFAS 133 intends for the newly recognized earnings component attributed to 
risk management derivatives to timely reflect hedge ineffectiveness, a key concept emphasized 
throughout the statement. This is achieved by the application of hedge accounting, defined as 
“special accounting treatment that alters the normal accounting for one or more components of a 
hedge so that counterbalancing changes in the fair values of hedged items and hedging 
instruments, from the date the hedge is established, are not included in earnings in different 
periods”(SFAS 133, Paragraph 320). In fact, a lot of the technical complexities of SFAS 133 are 
associated with the application of hedge accounting, particularly the qualifying requirement and 
the measurement of hedge ineffectiveness. The implicit assumption behind this accounting 
maneuver is that, by carefully matching the fair value gains/losses of the hedging instrument and 
the hedged item, SFAS 133 requires accounting earnings to capture an important aspect of 
underlying firm performance (i.e. hedge ineffectiveness) rather than simply the effect of market 
price fluctuations during the period.  
Consistent with this conceptual framework, the earnings recognition requirement under 
SFAS 133 ensures that most types of hedge ineffectiveness are immediately incorporated into 
earnings. 8 In addition, if a non-trading derivative instrument does not qualify for hedge 
accounting under SFAS 133, the entire gains/losses on the derivative instrument has to be 
immediately recognized into earnings without any offsetting effect allowed. As most derivatives 
classified as other than trading by bank holding companies are reported as hedging rather than 
speculative derivatives, this situation arises mostly when the hedging relationship fails to meet 
the minimum effectiveness threshold required for hedge accounting. In this case, the recognized 
                                               
8
 The exception is for under-hedged cash flow hedges.  
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derivative gains/losses can be viewed as a measure of hedge ineffectiveness when the ability of 
the hedging pair to offset each other seriously deteriorates.  
The fair valued hedging performance measure used in this study is derived from bank 
holding companies’ FR-Y9C reports in the post-SFAS 133 period. Specifically, the variable is 
the sum of three Schedule HI (income statement) memoranda item M10(a), (b) and (c) ‘Impact 
on income of derivatives held for purposes other than trading’,  (i.e. bhck8761, bhck8762, and 
bhck8763). According to FR-Y9C instructions, the three M10 items should report the net sum of 
all amounts recognized in the income statements that are attributable to the use of non-trading 
derivatives based on whether the amounts impact interest income (M10a), interest expense 
(M10b), or other (non-interest) allocations (M10c). Moreover, one of the edit tests designed to 
check the internal consistency of the data reported in FR-Y9C form (listed in December 2005 
FR-Y9C instruction form) explicitly states that the aggregated income effect of non-trading 
derivatives should be non-zero as long as the total notional amount of non-trading derivatives 
exceeds one million: "If the sum of HC-L13A, HC-L13B, HC-L13C andHC-L13D is greater than 
$1M, then the sum of HI-Mem10a through HI-Mem10c should not equal zero. If (bhck8725 + 
bhck8726 + bhck8727 + bhck8728) gt 1000, then (bhck8761 + bhck8762 +bhck8763) ne 0". 
It is important to differentiate the hedging performance measure discussed above from the 
change in the fair value of non-trading derivatives. In particular, the fair valued hedging 
performance measure captures the effect of hedge accounting under SFAS 133 and therefore 
incorporates the offsetting gains/losses on the hedged item. As a check for data validity, I 
calculated the change in the fair value of non-trading derivatives in each period based on non-
trading derivative fair values reported in FR-Y9C Schedule HC-L and compared it to the 
earnings component attributed to non-trading derivatives under SFAS 133. The two values 
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diverge significantly. This is still the case for bank holding companies that do not use cash flow 
hedges (when the accumulated net gains/losses on cash flow hedges reported in Schedule HC-R, 
i.e. bhck4336, has consistently zero values across all periods) and thus no gains/losses from non-
trading derivatives are deferred to OCI. Further analysis confirms that the two measures are not 
correlated with a very low correlation coefficient of 0.0039 and a corresponding p value of 0.86. 
Descriptive statistics for the two measures are reported in Panel D of Table 1. I also include 
descriptive statistics for the absolute value of the two measures to indicate the two measures’ 
relative magnitude.  
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CHAPTER 5: EMPIRICAL TESTS AND RESULTS 
Forecasting Power of Hedging Performance (H1a and H1b) 
This section reports results on the time series property and forecasting relevance of the 
earnings component unique to SFAS 133. The analysis is based on the following two equations: 
(1) HEDGEi,t+1 = a0 + a1HEDGEi,t +  εi,t    
(2) IBi,t+1 = b0 + b1EXIBi,t + b2HEDGEi,t +  εi,t   
The dependent variable in equation (1) is next quarter’s fair-value-based hedging 
performance measure, scaled by the market value of equity at the beginning of the quarter. The 
dependent variable in equation (2) is next quarter’s income before extraordinary items, scaled by 
the market value of equity at the beginning of the quarter. HEDGE is the earnings component 
attributed to hedging derivatives under SFAS 133, scaled by the market value of equity at the 
beginning of the quarter. EXIB is income before extraordinary items excluding the earnings 
component attributed to hedging derivatives under SFAS 133, scaled by the market value of 
equity at the beginning of the quarter.  
Coefficient a1 in equation (1) indicates the time series property of the fair-value-based 
hedging performance measure. A non-zero a1 would suggest that current hedging performance 
has predictive power over future hedging performance and thus violates the ‘unpredictability’ 
property of transitory earnings as defined in Ohlson (1999). Coefficient b2 in equation (2) shows 
whether the earnings component unique to SFAS 133 has predictive power over future total 
earnings. A non-zero b2 would violate the ‘forecasting irrelevance’ property of transitory 
earnings.  
As the scope of SFAS 133 is limited to the accounting treatment of hedging derivatives, the 
analysis in this section is based on the subsample of hedging derivative users in the post-SFAS 
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133 period. Given that firms self-select into the hedging derivative user and non-user group, 
empirical evidence on SFAS 133’s income statement effect is based on a non-randomly selected 
subgroup (the hedging derivative user group). As such, self-selection bias may arise to the extent 
that the decision as to whether to use derivates to hedge following the adoption of SFAS 133 is 
endogenous to the standard’s impact on the informational properties of accounting earnings. This 
seems plausible in light of the criticism that SFAS 133 would distort hedging choices as firms 
stop use hedging derivatives in order to avoid the perceived adverse impact of hedging 
derivatives on their financial statements under SFAS 133. While empirical findings from 
previous literature (e.g. Ahmed et al. 2006) provide no evidence that this concern actually 
materializes, it is preferable to address the potential self selection bias.  
I follow the common approach to use the Heckman two-stage method to control for the self-
selection bias. In the first stage, I use a probit model to predict the use of hedging derivatives 
based on Sinkey and Carter (2000). The predictors for the fist-stage regression include LNTASS 
(natural logarithm of total assets), EQRAT (book value of equity scaled by total assets), NIM 
(net interest income scaled by total assets), NOTES (notes and debentures scaled by total assets), 
DIV (dividend payout scaled by total assets), LIQUID (liquid assets), GAP12 (the absolute value 
of the difference between assets repricing or maturing within 12 months and liabilities repricing 
or maturing within 12 months, scaled by total assets), and NETCO (net loan charge off scaled by 
total assets). 
Table 2 reports results on the forecasting power of the fair-value-based hedging performance 
measure recognized into earnings under SFAS 133. The post-SFAS 133 period observations of 
bank holding companies in my sample form the population sample for the two stage analysis. 
The population sample consists of observations that use hedging derivatives and observations 
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that do not use hedging derivatives. The observations within the population sample that do not 
use hedging derivatives are referred to as the censored observations because it is impossible to 
observe the value of the variable of interest (the fair-value-based hedging performance measure 
recognized into earnings under SFAS 133). The observations within the population sample that 
use hedging derivatives are referred to as the uncensored observations because the value of the 
variable of interest (the fair-value-based hedging performance measure recognized into earnings 
under SFAS 133) can be observed.  
Panel A reports the coefficient estimates from the first-stage selection model, while Panels B 
and C report the second stage model based on equation (1) and (2) respectively. As shown in 
Panel A, almost all of the predictors included in the selection model have a significant loading, 
suggesting that the selection model is well-specified. Panel B reports that the fair valued hedging 
performance measure in equation (1) has an estimated coefficient of 0.5512 with a z statistic of 
29.29, thus rejecting H1a (unpredictability). Panel C reports that the fair valued hedging 
performance measure in equation (2) has an estimated coefficient of 0.5035 with a z statistic of 
26.03, thus rejecting H1b (forecasting irrelevance).  
I replicate the above analysis based on OLS regression and get consistent results (not 
tabulated).9 Specifically, a1 is estimated to be 0.5546 with a two-way clustered t stat of 14.07 
(clustered by firm and quarter). Moreover, the model that uses current hedging performance to 
predict next quarter’s hedging has an R square of 0.3116. The fair-value-based hedging 
performance measure also has incremental explanatory power over future total earnings. In 
particular, hedging performance has an estimated parameter of 0.5347 with a clustered t value of 
6.30 in equation (2). I also examine the time series properties of the changes in fair values of 
                                               
9
 To avoid bias in standard error estimates resulting from correlated residual errors in panel data, I follow the 
recommendation of Petersen (2009) and report two-way clustered standard errors and t statistics (clustered by firm 
and quarter). 
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hedging derivatives and document a negative first order autocorrelation coefficient of -0.5370 
with an R square of 0.2251. Taken together, the results highlight the different time series 
properties of the two fair-value-based measures. In particular, the fair-value-based hedging 
performance measure recognized into earnings under SFAS 133 is shown to be persistent with a 
positive autocorrelation while the fair values of hedging derivatives are mean reverting with 
changes in these fair values exhibiting a negative autocorrelation. 
Pre-and-post Comparison of Earnings Response Coefficients (H2) 
This section discusses tests comparing earnings response coefficient across the pre- and post-
SFAS 133 period. The underlying assumption of the empirical strategy is that any impact of 
SFAS 133 on earnings is more prominent for firms using more hedging derivatives 10 . 
Specifically, I use the following returns-earnings model to examine the differential change in 
earnings response coefficient from pre- to post-SFAS 133 period: 
(3) reti,t=α0 + α1IBi,t + α2LOSS + α3 AFTER + α4IBi,t*LOSS + α5IBi,t*AFTER+ 
α6NOTIONALi,t + α7IBi,t*NOTIONAL i,t + α8NOTIONAL i,t*AFTER + 
α9IBi,t*AFTER*NOTIONAL i,t + εi,t  
The dependent variable reti,t is defined as bank holding company i’s 5-day cumulative return 
around the day when earnings for quarter t is announced. I use both raw returns and market-
adjusted returns (adjusted for CRSP value weighted market return). IB is income before 
extraordinary items scaled by the market value of equity at the beginning of the quarter. LOSS is 
a dummy variable coded as 1 when IB is negative control for the well-known differential 
valuation of negative earnings (Hayn 1995). AFTER is a dummy variable coded as 1 for 
                                               
10
 One potential concern with this approach is that hedging derivative use may change over time and could be 
affected by the adoption of SFAS 133. In this regard, Ahmed et al. (2006) document that there is no significant 
change in bank holding companies’ extent of derivative usage and composition of the derivative instrument portfolio 
from pre- to post-SFAS 133 period. My sample yield similar results.  
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observations in the post-SFAS 133 period. NOTIONAL is the measure of hedging derivative 
exposure, defined as the total notional amount of non-trading derivatives scaled by the market 
value of equity at the beginning of the quarter (a value of zero for non- users).  
The coefficients for the interaction terms in equation (3) indicate how earnings response 
coefficient varies across sections. The coefficient of interest is α9, which captures the differential 
magnitude of the change in earnings valuation coefficient following the adoption of SFAS 133 
based on the level of hedging derivative exposure. By focusing on the difference in the change 
across sections, this approach helps remove effects due to factors unrelated to SFAS 133.  
I estimate equation (3) using the full sample, as well as the subsample of bank holding 
companies that have observations in both the pre-and post-SFAS 133 periods (the matched 
sample). As the analysis based on the matched sample uses the same set of bank holding 
companies in the pre-and-post comparison, it helps rule out the possibility that the detected 
change in the valuation coefficient of earnings results from the sample difference across the pre- 
and post-SFAS 133 periods. To avoid bias in standard error estimates resulting from correlated 
residual errors in panel data, I report two-way clustered standard errors and t- statistics (clustered 
by firm and time). 
As reported in Table 3, the coefficient on the three-way interaction term (α9) is consistently 
positive and significant across the models regardless of the choice of return measure and sample 
base. The results suggest that the adoption of SFAS 133 is associated with an increase in 
earnings informativeness for bank holding companies with higher level hedging derivative 
exposure, a pattern that is consistent with the notion that SFAS 133 improves earnings as a 
summary measure of firm performance by requiring the recognition of hedge ineffectiveness.  
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Relative Explanatory Power of Alternative Income Measures (H3) 
This section reports analysis comparing two alternative ‘versions’ of earnings, one including 
the fair-value-based hedging performance measure and the other excluding it, to determine 
which one has the superior ability to reflect firm performance (H3). Following Dechow (1994) 
and Dhaliwal et al. (1999), I compare the two performance measures based on a likelihood ratio 
test designed to evaluate competing non-nested models (Vuong 1989). Intuitively, Vuong’s test 
provides a statistical procedure to determine which model ‘fits’ the data better (i.e., which model 
has relatively more explanatory power over the dependent variable for the given data). 
Consistent with Dechow (1994) and Dhaliwal et al. (1999), I use concurrent stock returns as the 
benchmark to evaluate the relative ability of the two performance measures to reflect firm 
performance based on the assumption that stock prices efficiently impound all information 
concerning firm performance.   
Naturally, one expects hedging performance to contribute more to earnings’ ability to 
summarize information on firm performance for sections where hedging derivatives are most 
likely to have material impact on firm performance. As such, I sort the sample of hedging 
derivative users into quintiles based on the level of hedging derivative exposure and perform 
Vuong’s tests for that sample and for each quintile. Consistent with previous research (Barton  
2001; Guay 1999), I measure hedging derivative exposure as the total notional amount of non-
trading derivatives scaled by the market value of equity at the beginning of the quarter.  
Panel A of Table 4 reports the descriptive statistics on hedging derivative exposure across 
quintiles. Clearly, the use of hedging derivatives is highly concentrated among heavy derivative 
users. For example, observations in the top quintile account for more than 90% of hedging 
derivatives outstanding measured by the total notional amount. This pattern still holds for the 
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size-adjusted measure of hedging derivative exposure. In particular, observations in the top 
quintile have an average exposure level of 3.45 while observations in the bottom quintile have an 
average exposure level of 0.02.  
For the sample of hedging derivative users and for each quintile within the sample, I perform 
Vuong’s tests to compare the relative explanatory power of the following two models: 
(4) Ri,t = β0 + β1IBi,t + β2LOSS i,t  + β3 IBi,t _LOSS i,t  +  εi,t    
(5) Ri,t = β0 + β1EXIBi,t + β2LOSSE i,t  + β3 EXIBi,t _LOSSE i,t  +  εi,t  
IBi,t is bank holding company’s income before extraordinary items during quarter t, scaled by 
the market value of equity at the beginning of the quarter. EXIB is quarterly income before 
extraordinary items excluding the earnings component attributed to hedging derivatives under 
SFAS 133. LOSS is a dummy variable coded as 1 if IB is negative and LOSSE is a dummy 
variable coded as 1 if EXIB is negative.11 The dependent variable is the bank holding company’s 
cumulative stock returns during the same quarter.  
One issue of concern regarding this analysis is whether stock returns efficiently impound all 
available information. If investors are ‘fixated’ on earnings, Vuong’s tests using stock returns as 
the benchmark will be biased in favor of  the earnings measure in the reported form. Therefore, it 
is important to corroborate the results using an alternative benchmark based on future realized 
measures of performance such as future earnings (Skinner 1999). To address this problem, I use 
future earnings as an alternative benchmark and replicate Vuong’s tests for the sample of 
hedging derivative users and for each quintile of hedging derivative exposure. 
Panel B of Table 4 reports the results for Vuong’s tests using concurrent stock returns as the 
benchmark. For the sample of bank holding companies in the post-SFAS 133 period, the 
earnings model has a R2 of 0.0938 while the model based on the income measure excluding the 
                                               
11
 Loss dummies are included to control for the well-known differential valuation of negative earnings (Hayn 1995). 
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earnings component attributed to hedging derivatives has a R2 of 0.0485. Vuong’s test confirms 
that accounting earnings outperforms the alternative income measure in terms of the ability to 
explain concurrent stock returns with a Z statistic of 4.42. Results by hedging derivative quintiles 
show that the superior explanatory power of earning is more prominent among sections with 
higher level of hedging derivative exposure, both in terms of statistical significance and the 
magnitude of the difference in explanatory power. Moving from the lowest to the highest quintile, 
the difference in R2 between the two models increases from 0.004 (0.0324 versus 0.0283) to 
0.068 (0.0972 versus 0.0296). The results suggest that the recognition of the fair-value-based 
hedging performance measure improves earnings as a summary measure of firm performance.  
As reported in Panel C of Table 4, Vuong’s tests using future earnings as the benchmark 
yield similar results. For the sample of bank holding companies in the post-SFAS 133 period, the 
earnings model has a R2 of 0.2628 while the model based on the income measure excluding the 
earnings component attributed to hedging derivatives has a R2 of 0.1638. Vuong’s test confirms 
that earnings outperforms the alternative income measure with a Z statistic of 2.13. Moving from 
the lowest to the highest quintile, the difference in R2 between the two models consistently and 
significantly increases. The findings corroborate the results based on analyses using stock returns 
as the benchmark to evaluate alternative income measures.   
 Valuation Coefficients of Hedging Gains and Hedging Losses (H4) 
This section reports empirical tests that examine whether hedging losses are given a higher 
weight than hedging gains. Specifically, I estimate the following two equations for the sample of 
hedging derivative users and for each quintile formed based on the level of hedging derivative 
exposure, as described in the last section: 
(6)  Ri,t=γ0 + γ1EXIBi,t + γ2HEDGE i,t  +  εi,t, and  
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(7)  Ri,t=γ0 + γ1EXIBi,t + γ2HEDGE i,t + γ3LOSSE i,t + γ4LOSSH i,t + γ5EXIBi,t*LOSSE i,t +  
γ6HEDGEi,t*LOSSH i,t +  εi,t  
EXIB is income before extraordinary items excluding the earnings component attributed to 
hedging derivatives under SFAS 133, scaled by the market value of equity at the beginning of 
the quarter. HEDGE is the earnings component attributed to hedging derivatives under SFAS 
133, scaled by the market value of equity at the beginning of the quarter. LOSSE is a dummy 
variable coded as 1 when EXIB is negative and LOSSH is a dummy variable coded as 1 when 
HEDGE is negative.  
As the sample of the analysis is limited to hedging derivative users in the post-SFAS 133 
period, I use the Heckman two-stage method to control for the potential self-selection bias as 
discussed in Section 5.1. The first stage selection model is identical to the model discussed in 
Section 5.1. In the second stage, I estimate equation (6) and (7) with the inverse mills ratio 
derived from the first stage as an additional implicit independent variable that is intended to be 
the correction for sample selection bias. As a baseline model, equation (6) examines whether the 
earnings component attributed to hedging derivatives provides incremental explanatory power 
over concurrent stock returns in the post-SFAS 133 period. At the same time, equation (7) is 
intended to capture the differential valuation implication of hedging gains and losses.  
Table 5 reports the results from the two-stage analysis. Panel A reports the coefficient 
estimates from the first-stage selection model, while Panels B and C report the second stage 
model based on equation (6) and (7) respectively. As reported in Panel B, the coefficient on 
HEDGE in Panel B has a coefficient estimate of 2.15 with a z value of 8.05 and a p value lower 
than 0.01, suggesting that the hedging performance measure recognized under SFAS 133 has 
incremental power over concurrent stock returns. The coefficient on HEDGE_LOSSH in Panel C 
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has a coefficient estimate of 3.29 with a z value of 4.21 and a p value lower than 0.01, suggesting 
that the hedging losses have a higher valuation coefficient than hedging gains.  
I replicate the analysis based on OLS regression to compare patterns across different levels of 
hedging derivative exposure. The results are reported in Table 6. The first column of Table 6 
confirms the results from the two-stage analysis. Specifically, the earnings component attributed 
to SFAS 133 has incremental power over concurrent stock (γ2 from equation (6) is positive and 
statistically significant with a clustered t value of 2.87) and that hedging losses have a higher 
valuation coefficient than do hedging gains (γ6 from equation (7) is positive and statistically 
significant with a clustered t value of 2.05). Moreover, Further analysis shows that the 
asymmetric valuation of hedging gains and losses is driven by heavy derivative users (γ6 from 
equation (7) is positive and statistically significant only for the top exposure quintile with a 
clustered t value of 2.68). As discussed earlier, the use of hedging derivatives is highly 
concentrated in the heavy users. The results reported in Table 6 are consistent with the notion 
that the fair valued hedging performance measure, in particular hedging losses, captures value-
relevant information, especially for the section where hedging derivatives are most likely to have 
material impact on firm performance. 
Hedge Ineffectiveness and Idiosyncratic Volatility (H5) 
This section reports analysis on the association between idiosyncratic volatility and hedge 
ineffectiveness recognized in earnings under SFAS 133 based on the sample of hedging 
derivative users in the post-SFAS 133 period. As I expect the impact of hedging activities on 
firm-specific risk to be most significant for firms with the highest level of hedging derivative, I 
perform a double-sort analysis based on the sample of hedging derivative users in the post-SFAS 
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133 period to examine whether a greater level of hedge ineffectiveness over time is associated 
with higher idiosyncratic risk for firms with higher level of hedging derivative exposure.  
Specifically, for each quarter, I first sort the observations into five groups based on the same 
measure of hedging derivative exposure used earlier (total notional amount of hedging 
derivatives scaled by the market value of equity at the beginning of each quarter). Then, within 
each group, I further sort observations into quintiles based on hedge ineffectiveness over time 
(measured as the volatility of the earnings component attributed to hedging derivatives over the 
most recent eight quarters, scaled by the market equity value at the beginning of the quarter). 
Consistent with Ang et al. (2006) and Jiang et al. (2009), I measure idiosyncratic risk for each 
bank-quarter as the standard deviation of the residuals from the time series regression based on 
the Fama-French three-factor model using daily CRSP return data.  
Table 7 reports the results from the double sort analysis that examines the association 
between hedge ineffectiveness and idiosyncratic risk. Within each quintile portfolio formed 
based on the level of size-adjusted hedging derivative exposure, the observations are further 
sorted into quintiles based on hedge ineffective measured as the size-adjusted volatility of the 
earnings component attributed to hedging derivatives from the most recent eight quarters. For 
each level of hedging derivative exposure, Table 7 reports the average idiosyncratic stock return 
volatility for each quintile and the difference between the top and bottom quintiles along with the 
corresponding Newey-West t statistic.  
The results show that for the top quintile of hedging derivative users, idiosyncratic stock 
return volatility increases from 1.03% for the low hedge ineffectiveness portfolio to 1.39% for 
the high hedge ineffectiveness portfolio, resulting in a statistically significant difference of 
0.36%. In contrast, the difference between the top and bottom hedge ineffectiveness portfolios is 
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not statistically significant and of a noticeably smaller magnitude for the other four quintiles of 
hedging derivative users. As the use of hedging derivatives is highly concentrated among the 
heavy users, this finding is consistent with the notion that hedge ineffectiveness signals increased 
firm-specific risk when hedging derivatives have the potential to materially impact the firm’s 
financial results. The results provide evidence in support of the claim by the financial analyst 




CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION 
SFAS 133 requires most types of hedge ineffectiveness to be measured on a fair value basis 
and reported in earnings. This earnings recognition requirement was the focal point of 
controversy surrounding the adoption of SFAS 133. The debate also reflects the more general 
controversy over whether to recognize fair-value-based gains or losses into earnings. Using a 
sample of bank holding companies, I find evidence that the newly recognized earnings 
component following the adoption of SFAS 133 (i.e. the fair-value-based hedging performance 
measure) improves the value and risk relevance of accounting earnings. The findings of this 
study are relevant to the evaluation of SFAS 133 as well as the ongoing debate on the income 
statement treatment of net asset changes due to the application of fair value accounting. 
There may be concerns about whether the findings are generalizable to other sectors, 
especially non-financial industries. In particular, it is likely that the information content of 
derivative gains/losses is higher for bank holding companies because risk management is more 
central to the core business and competitive advantage possibilities among financial than non-
financial sector firms. On the other hand, using a sample of bank holding companies can help 
accurately capture the effect of SFAS 133 by focusing on a setting more likely to be 
representative of the population of interest, where hedging derivatives are expected to be of 
material significance to financial reporting. Future research may examine whether the inferences 
from this study are valid for non-financial sectors where the impact of hedging derivatives are 
also expected to be material.  
Another promising avenue for future research on SFAS 133’s income statement effects is in 
the area of earnings management. For example, firms may take advantage of the differential 
accounting treatment for fair value and cash flow hedge under SFAS 133 to manipulate earnings. 
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The high-profile cases of Fannie Mae’s abuse of cash flow hedge accounting provide anecdotal 
evidence for such a scenario. Further empirical evidence of SFAS 133’s impact on earnings 
management behavior is important for a complete profile of the consequences of the standard. 
Such studies would require the simultaneous consideration of firms’ incentive to manage 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Panel A : Sample period (1995-2005)         
Variables  N Mean STD p5 Q1 Median Q3 p95 
Total assets (book value) 11110 12,638 65,802 231.29 485.21 1,049.89 3,757.70 44,248.95 
Total assets (risk-weighted) 10320 9,879 50,074 155.37 336.30 736.61 2,585.94 33,990.38 
Tier1 risk-based capital ratio  10320 0.1246 0.0406 0.0797 0.1010 0.1163 0.1389 0.1913 
Total risk-based capital ratio 10320 0.1408 0.0404 0.1045 0.1177 0.1314 0.1525 0.2060 
Notional amount of non-trading derivatives (un-scaled) 10765 3,674.20 26,451.93 0.00 0.00 0.00 65.00 7102.00 
Absolute net fair value of non-trading derivatives (un-scaled) 10760 19.84 149.61 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.39 50.12 
Notional amount of non-trading derivatives (scaled) 10765 0.3792 1.5957 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1559 1.6494 
Absolute net fair value of non-trading derivatives (scaled) 10760 0.0033 0.0277 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0008 0.0139 
Percentage of observations with non-zero hedging derivatives 37.63%        
Panel B: Pre-SFAS 133 period (1995-2000)         
Variables  N Mean STD p5 Q1 Median Q3 p95 
Total assets (book value) 5458 10,849.66 44,860.99 215.04 448.51 1,065.97 3,984.39 43,759.52 
Total assets (risk-weighted) 4668 8,884.35 38,488.62 137.66 306.91 710.88 2,837.20 34,950.05 
Tier1 risk-based capital ratio  4668 0.1274 0.0438 0.0768 0.1009 0.1201 0.1452 0.1951 
Total risk-based capital ratio 4668 0.1440 0.0451 0.1030 0.1188 0.1350 0.1578 0.2116 
Notional amount of non-trading derivatives (un-scaled) 5178 3,474.53 22,364.39 0.00 0.00 0.00 80.00 8,464.79 
Absolute net fair value of non-trading derivatives (un-scaled) 5172 13.97 87.36 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.36 41.00 
Notional amount of non-trading derivatives (scaled) 5178 0.4213 1.4322 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1642 1.9198 
Absolute net fair value of non-trading derivatives (scaled) 5172 0.0030 0.0296 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0008 0.0116 
Percentage of observations with non-zero hedging derivatives 36.95%        
Panel C: Post-SFAS 133 period (2001-2005)         
Variables  N Mean STD p5 Q1 Median Q3 p95 
Total assets (book value) 5652 14,365.61 81,009.44 248.58 518.28 1,032.81 3,487.87 45,168.00 
Total assets (risk-weighted) 5652 10,701.39 57,910.93 165.40 360.80 753.85 2,438.78 33,918.40 
Tier1 risk-based capital ratio  5652 0.1223 0.0376 0.0821 0.1010 0.1142 0.1335 0.1857 
Total risk-based capital ratio 5652 0.1382 0.0359 0.1055 0.1171 0.1288 0.1485 0.2009 
Notional amount of non-trading derivatives (un-scaled) 5587 3,859.26 29,743.69 0.00 0.00 0.00 60.00 6,875.91 
Absolute net fair value of non-trading derivatives (un-scaled) 5588 25.27 189.68 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.42 60.51 
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Table 1 (cont.) 
 
Notional amount of non-trading derivatives (scaled) 5587 0.3402 1.7328 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1510 1.3300 
Absolute net fair value of non-trading derivatives (scaled) 5588 0.0036 0.0258 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0008 0.0162 
Percentage of observations with non-zero hedging derivatives 38.29%        
Panel D: Hedging derivative users in the post-SFAS 133 period 
Variables  (scaled by beginning market value of equity) N Mean STD P5 Q1 Median Q3 P95 
Earnings component attributed to non-trading derivatives 2159 0.0020 0.0111 -0.0036 -0.0002 0.0001 0.0019 0.0130 
Change in fair value of non-trading derivatives  2129 -0.0004 0.0372 -0.0100 -0.0012 0 0.0010 0.0107 
ABS earnings component attributed to non-trading derivatives  2159 0.0037 0.0107 0 0.0001 0.0009 0.0031 0.0157 
ABS change in fair value of non-trading derivatives 2129 0.0062 0.0366 0 0.0002 0.0012 0.0041 0.0194 
Income before extraordinary items 2164 0.0173 0.0167 0.0075 0.0148 0.0177 0.0206 0.0293 
 
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics based on information from FR-Y9C filing. All dollar variables are reported in millions. Total 
assets (book value) are the balance sheet book value of all assets held by the bank holding company (bhck2170). Per the regulatory 
requirement set by the Federal Reserve Bank, bank holding companies are required to calculate and report Total risk-weighted assets, 
Tier 1 capital and Total risk-based capital. Tier 1 capital ratio is calculated as Tier-1 capital (bhck8274) divided by Total risk-
weighted assets (bhckA223). Total risk-based capital ratio is calculated as Total risk-based capital (bhck3792) divided by Total risk-
weighted assets (bhckA223). Notional amount of non-trading derivatives (un-scaled) is the sum of total notional amount of all 
derivatives held for non-trading purpose across all categories. Absolute net fair value of non-trading derivative (un-scaled) is the 
absolute value of the net fair value of all derivatives held for non-trading purpose across all categories. Notional amount of non-
trading derivatives (scaled) and Absolute net fair value of non-trading derivatives (scaled) are calculated as the un-scaled amount 
divided by the market value of equity at the beginning of the reporting quarter. Percentage of observations with non-zero hedging 
derivatives is the percentage of bank-quarters with non-zero notional amount of derivatives for non-trading purpose.  
 
Panel D of Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics for major variables of interest for the subsample of hedging derivative users in the 
post-SFAS 133 period. All variables reported in Panel D are scaled by the market value of equity at the beginning of the quarter. 
Earnings component attributed to non-trading derivatives is calculated as the sum of Schedule HI memoranda item M10(a), (b) and (c) 
‘Impact on income of derivatives held for purposes other than trading’ (bhck8761+bhck8762+bhck8763). Change in fair value of non-
treading derivatives is the change in the net fair value of non-trading derivative positions last quarter’s value. Each period’s net fair 
value of derivative positions is calculated based on information reported in Schedule HC-L 
(bhck8741+bhck8742+bhck8743+bhck8744-bhck8745-bhck8746-bhck8747-bhck8748). ABS earnings component attributed to non-





Table 2: Forecasting Power of Hedging Performance 
 
Panel A: First stage selection model 

















N (population) 5382 
      
N (censored) 3445 
      
N(uncensored) 1937 
      
Panel B: Second stage (Predicting future hedging performance) 







     
N 1937       
Wald  
chi-square 857.91 p=0.00      
Panel C: Second stage (Predicting future total earnings) 






(-2.36)**      
N 1937       
Wald  
chi-square 679.53 p=0.00      
  
 
Table 2 reports results on the forecasting power of the fair-value-based hedging performance measure recognized into earnings under 
SFAS 133. Regression results are based on Heckman two-stage method to correct for potential self-selection bias. The post-SFAS 133 
period observations of bank holding companies in my sample form the population sample for the two stage analysis. The population 
sample consists of observations that use hedging derivatives and observations that do not use hedging derivatives. The observations 
within the population sample that do not use hedging derivatives are referred to as the censored observations because it is impossible 
to observe the value of the variable of interest (the fair-value-based hedging performance measure recognized into earnings under 
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SFAS 133). The observations within the population sample that use hedging derivatives are referred to as the uncensored observations 
because the value of the variable of interest (the fair-value-based hedging performance measure recognized into earnings under SFAS 
133) can be observed.  
 
Panel A reports the results of the fist-stage regression that models the selection of the uncensored observations from the population 
sample. The predictors are: Intercept (not tabulated), LNTASS (natural logarithm of total assets), EQRAT (book value of equity 
scaled by total assets), NIM (net interest income scaled by total assets), NOTES (notes and debentures scaled by total assets), DIV 
(dividend payout scaled by total assets), LIQUID (liquid assets consisting of cash and balances, federal funds sold, and securities 
purchased to resell, scaled by total assets ), GAP12 (the absolute value of the difference between assets repricing or maturing within 
12 months and liabilities repricing or maturing within 12 months, scaled by total assets), and NETCO (net loan charge off scaled by 
total assets). 
 
Panels B and C report the results of second-stage regressions based on the following models respectively:  
HEDGEi,t+1=a0 + a1HEDGEi,t +  εi,t    
IBi,t+1=b0 + b1EXIBi,t + b2HEDGEi,t +  εi,t  
 
HEDGE is the earnings component attributed to non-trading derivatives under SFAS 133 (the fair-value-based hedging performance 
measure recognized into earnings under SFAS 133, scaled by the market value of equity at the beginning of the quarter). IB is income 
before extraordinary items. EXIB is income before extraordinary items excluding the earnings component attributed to hedging 
derivatives under SFAS 133, scaled by the market value of equity at the beginning of the quarter. Mills (lamda) is the inverse mills 
ratio generated from the first-stage estimation that is intended to correct for sample selection bias.  
 
Z statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance (two-tailed test) at 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 level respectively. 
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Table 3: Pre-and-post Comparison of Earnings Response Coefficients 
 
Panel A: Earnings response coefficient (full sample ) 
5-day raw 
return 
IB LOSS IB* 
LOSS 




























R-square 0.06         




IB LOSS IB* 
LOSS 



























R-square 0.06         
No. of obs. 10155         
Panel B: Earnings response coefficient (matched sample) 
5-day raw 
return 
IB LOSS IB* 
LOSS 



























R-square 0.02         




IB LOSS IB* 
LOSS 



























R-square 0.02         
No. of obs. 6521         






Table 3 reports pooled regression results from the earnings-returns regressions based on the following model:   
reti,t=α0 + α1IBi,t + α2LOSS + α3 AFTER + α4IBi,t*LOSS + α5IBi,t*AFTER+ α6NOTIONALi,t + α7IBi,t*NOTIONAL i,t + 
α8NOTIONALi,t*AFTER + α9IBi,t*AFTER*NOTIONAL i,t + εi,t  
 
The dependent variable reti,t is defined as bank holding company i’s 5-day cumulative return around the day when earnings for quarter 
t is announced. I use both raw returns and market-adjusted returns (adjusted for CRSP value weighted market return). IB is income 
before extraordinary items scaled by the market value of equity at the beginning of the quarter. LOSS is a dummy variable coded as 1 
when IB is negative. AFTER is a dummy variable coded as 1 for observations in the post-SFAS 133 period. NOTIONAL is the 
measure of hedging derivative exposure, defined as the total notional amount of non-trading derivatives scaled by the market value of 
equity at the beginning of the quarter (a value of zero for non- users).  
 
Panel A reports regression results for the full sample. Panel B reports regression results for the matched sample representing bank 
holding companies that have observations in both the pre-and post-SFAS 133 periods. Two-way clustered t statistics are reported in 
parentheses (clustered by firm and quarter). *, **, and *** indicate significance (two-tailed test) at 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 level 
respectively. 
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Table 4: Relative Explanatory Power of Alternative Income Measures 
 










(in thousands of 
dollars) 
Percentage of 





Sample  0.8783 0.2518 9,963,812 100.00% 2164 
Quintile 1 0.0251 0.0220 31,519 0.06% 432 
Quintile 2 0.1164 0.1139 245,788 0.49% 433 
Quintile 3 0.2547 0.2518 1,063,962 2.14% 433 
Quintile 4 0.5468 0.5161 3,392,628 6.81% 433 
Quintile 5 3.4467 1.7580 45,062,224 90.49% 433 










Vuong’s Z statistic p-value  Number of 
observations 
Sample 0.0938 0.0485 4.42 0.00 2133 
Quintile 1 0.0324 0.0283 1.36 0.17 429 
Quintile 2 0.1255 0.1053 1.13 0.26 431 
Quintile 3 0.1091 0.0887 1.69 0.09 421 
Quintile 4 0.1280 0.0955 1.97 0.05 426 
Quintile 5 0.0972 0.0296 3.42 0.00 426 










Vuong’s Z statistic p- value  Number of 
observations 
Sample 0.2628 0.1638 2.13 0.03 1940 
Quintile 1 0.1558 0.1729 -1.52 0.13 372 
Quintile 2 0.1194 0.0947 0.97 0.33 385 
Quintile 3 0.3977 0.3567 2.62 0.00 387 
Quintile 4 0.3445 0.2821 1.73 0.08 399 
Quintile 5 0.3351 0.0910 1.64 0.10 397 
 
Table 4 reports results of tests comparing the explanatory power for two alternative income 
measures (earnings and earnings excluding the earnings component attributed to hedging 
derivatives under SFAS 133) based on the subsample of hedging derivative users in the post 
SFAS 133 period. This sample is further sorted into quintiles based on the level of hedging 
derivative exposure, measured as the total notional amount of non-trading derivatives scaled by 
the market level of equity at the beginning of the quarter.  
 
Panel A reports descriptive statistics on hedging derivative exposure for the overall sample and 
for each hedging derivative exposure quintile within the sample. 
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Panel B reports results comparing the following two models:  
Ri,t=β0 + β1IBi,t + β2LOSS i,t  + β3 IBi,t _LOSS i,t  +  εi,t    
Model (Earnings Adj. for hedging derivatives):   
Ri,t=β0 + β1EXIBi,t + β2LOSSE i,t  + β3 EXIBi,t _LOSSE i,t  +  εi,t  
 
The dependent variable is the bank holding company’s cumulative stock returns during the same 
quarter. IBi,t is bank holding company’s income before extraordinary items during quarter t, 
scaled by the market value of equity and the beginning of the quarter. EXIB is quarterly income 
before extraordinary items excluding the earnings component attributed to hedging derivatives 
under SFAS 133. LOSS is a dummy variable coded as 1 if IB is negative and LOSSE is a 
dummy variable coded as 1 EXIB is negative. Panel B reports R2 for each model and Vuong’s 
(1989) Z-statistic comparing the explanatory power of the two models for the overall sample and 
for each hedging derivative exposure quintile within the sample.  
 
Panel C reports results comparing the following two models:  
IBi,t+1=β0 + β1IBi,t + β2LOSSi,t  + β3 IBi,t _LOSSi,t  +  εi,t    
Model (Earnings Adj. for hedging derivatives):   
IBi,t+1=β0 + β1EXIBi,t + β2LOSSEi,t  + β3 EXIBi,t _LOSSEi,t  +  εi,t  
 
The dependent variables is next quarter’s earning scaled by the market value of equity at the 
beginning at the quarter. All the independent variables are the same as discussed above. Panel C 
reports R2 for each model and Vuong’s (1989) Z-statistic comparing the explanatory power of 





Table 5: Valuation Coefficients of Hedging Gains/Losses 
 
Panel A: First stage selection model 


















      
N(censored) 3471 
      
N(uncensored) 2130 
      
Panel B: Second stage (Model 1) 







     
N 2130 
      
Wald  
chi-square 130.10 p=0.00      
Panel C: Second stage (Model 2) 
















N 2130       
Wald  
chi-square 187.50 p=0.00      
 
Table 5 reports two-stage regression results on the incremental explanatory power of hedging gains/losses over concurrent stock 
returns in the post-SFAS 133 period (2001-2005). Regression results are based on Heckman two-stage method to correct for potential 
self-selection bias. The post-SFAS 133 period observations of bank holding companies in my sample form the population sample for 
the two stage analysis. The population sample consists of observations that use hedging derivatives and observations that do not use 
hedging derivatives. The observations within the population sample that do not use hedging derivatives are referred to as the censored 
observations because it is impossible to observe the value of the variable of interest (the fair-value-based hedging performance 
measure recognized into earnings under SFAS 133). The observations within the population sample that use hedging derivatives are 
referred to as the uncensored observations because the value of the variable of interest (the fair-value-based hedging performance 
measure recognized into earnings under SFAS 133) can be observed.  
 49
 
Panel A reports the results of the fist-stage regression that models the selection of the uncensored observations from the population 
sample. The predictors are: Intercept (not tabulated), LNTASS (natural logarithm of total assets), EQRAT (book value of equity 
scaled by total assets), NIM (net interest income scaled by total assets), NOTES (notes and debentures scaled by total assets), DIV 
(dividend payout scaled by total assets), LIQUID (liquid assets consisting of cash and balances, federal funds sold, and securities 
purchased to resell, scaled by total assets ), GAP12 (the absolute value of the difference between assets repricing or maturing within 
12 months and liabilities repricing or maturing within 12 months, scaled by total assets), and NETCO (net loan charge off scaled by 
total assets). 
 
Panels B and C report the results of second-stage regressions based on the following models respectively:  
Model 1:  Ri,t=γ0 + γ1EXIBi,t + γ2HEDGE i,t  +  εi,t, and  
Model 2: Ri,t=γ0 + γ1EXIBi,t + γ2HEDGE i,t + γ3LOSSE i,t + γ4LOSSH i,t + γ5EXIBi,t*LOSSE i,t +  γ6HEDGEi,t*LOSSH i,t +  εi,t . 
 
Ri,t is bank i’s cumulative stock returns during the same quarter. EXIB is income before extraordinary items excluding the earnings 
component attributed to hedging derivatives under SFAS 133, scaled by the market value of equity at the beginning of the quarter. 
HEDGE is the earnings component attributed to non-trading derivatives under SFAS 133 (the fair-value-based hedging performance 
measure recognized into earnings under SFAS 133), scaled by the market value of equity at the beginning of the quarter) . LOSSE is a 
dummy variable coded as 1 when EXIB is negative and LOSSH is a dummy variable coded as 1 when HEDGE is negative. Mills 
(lamda) is the inverse mills ratio generated from the first-stage estimation that is intended to correct for sample selection bias. 
 




Table 6: Incremental Explanatory Power of Hedging Gains/Losses by Level of Hedging Derivative Exposure 
 

























R-squared 0.0516 0.0305 0.0281 0.0557 0.1179 0.0374 
Number of observations 2133 429 431 421 426 426 









































































R-squared 0.0807 0.0386 0.1269 0.1151 0.1439 0.0884 
Number of observations 2133 429 431 421 426 426 
 
 
Table 6 reports OLS regression results on the incremental explanatory power of hedging gains/losses over concurrent stock returns 
based on the subsample of hedging derivative users in the post-SFAS 133 period (2001-2005). This sample is further sorted into 
quintiles based on the level of hedging derivative exposure, measured as the total notional amount of non-trading derivatives scaled by 
the market level of equity at the beginning of the quarter. Regression results are reported for the overall sample and for each hedging 
derivative exposure quintile within the sample 
 
Panels A and B report OLS regression results based on the following models respectively: 
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Model A:  Ri,t=γ0 + γ1EXIBi,t + γ2HEDGE i,t  +  εi,t, and  
Modle B: Ri,t=γ0 + γ1EXIBi,t + γ2HEDGE i,t + γ3LOSSE i,t + γ4LOSSH i,t + γ5EXIBi,t*LOSSE i,t +  γ6HEDGEi,t*LOSSH i,t +  εi,t . 
 
Ri,t is bank i’s cumulative stock returns during the same quarter. EXIB is income before extraordinary items excluding the earnings 
component attributed to hedging derivatives under SFAS 133, scaled by the market value of equity at the beginning of the quarter. 
HEDGE is the earnings component attributed to hedging derivatives under SFAS 133, scaled by the market value of equity at the 
beginning of the quarter. LOSSE is a dummy variable coded as 1 when EXIB is negative and LOSSH is a dummy variable coded as 1 
when HEDGE is negative. 
 
Two-way clustered t-statistics (by firm and quarter) are reported in parentheses *, **, and *** indicate significance (two-tailed test) at 
0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 level respectively. 
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Table 7: Hedge Ineffectiveness and Idiosyncratic Volatility 
 
 
The analysis reported in Table 7 is based on the subsample of hedging derivative users from the 
post-SFAS 133 period. For each quarter, I first sort the observations in the subsample into five 
groups based on a size-adjusted measure of hedging derivative exposure level (total notional 
amount of hedging derivatives scaled by the market equity value at the beginning of the quarter). 
Then within each group, I further sort observations into quintiles based on volatility of hedging 
performance. Hedging performance volatility is measured as the volatility of the earnings 
component attributed to hedging derivatives under SFAS 133 over the most recent eight quarters 
up to the beginning of the current quarter, scaled by the market equity value at the beginning of 




Q1 (Low) Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 (High) 
Volatility of hedging 
performance 
     
Q1 (Low) 1.19 1.30 1.38 1.12 1.03 
Q2 1.27 1.28 1.11 1.11 1.09 
Q3 1.33 1.38 1.41 1.07 1.03 
Q4 1.28 1.33 1.35 1.22 1.21 
Q5 (High) 1.40 1.42 1.21 1.15 1.39 
Q5(High)-Q1(Low) 0.21 0.12 -0.17 0.03 0.36 
Newey-West t statistic 1.46 1.52 -1.60 0.34 2.20** 
 
 
Table 7 reports the average idiosyncratic stock return volatility (in percentage) for each quintile 
portfolio, along with the differences between the top and bottom quintiles and the corresponding 
Newey-West t-statistics. Idiosyncratic volatility for each bank-quarter is measured as the 
standard deviation of the residuals from the time series regression based on Fama-French three-
factor model for the current quarter using CRSP daily data. *, **, and *** indicate statistical 
significance at 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 level respectively (two-tailed test).  
 
 
 
